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
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
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
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
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
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




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
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Rd 3			
...4	2	Gleichrichterröhren	5FG 3
Rd 5	1	Gleichrichterröhre	AZ 11
S 1	1	doppelpoliger Ausschalter	250 V, 2 A
S 2	1	einpolige Ruhestrom- Drucktaste	250 V, 1 A
S 3	1	einpoliger Ausschalter	250 V, 2 A
S 4	1	einpoliger Umschalter	250 V, 2 A
S 5	1	einpoliger Ausschalter	250 V, 2 A
S 6	1	doppelpoliger Ausschalter	250 V, 2 A
Si 1	1	Feinsicherung	2 A
St 1	1	doppelpoliger Schuko-Stecker	
St 2	1	doppelpoliger Stecker	
St 3	1	einpoliger Stecker	
...2	3	einpolige Stecker	
St 6	1	Kurzschlußstecker	
Tr 4	1	Hochspannungs-Netz- transformator	primär: 220 V sekundär: 3 kV, 2 mA 2x4 V, 0,6 A, 8 kV isoliert
Tr 5	1	Netztransformator	primär: 220 V, sekundär: 2x300 V, 40 mA 4 V, 1 A, 8 V, 1 A
W 9			
...17	9	Schichtwiderstände	je 2 MOhm, 2 W
W 18			
...20	9	Schichtwiderstände	je 2 MOhm, 2 W
W 22	1	Schicht-Potentiometer	je 3 MOhm, 1 W
W 28			
...35	6	Schichtwiderstände	je 5 MOhm, 2 W
W 34			
...40	6	Schichtwiderstände	je 5 MOhm, 2 W
W 41	1	Schichtwiderstand	2 MOhm, 1 W
W 42	1	Schichtwiderstand	2 MOhm, 1 W
		Prüfeinrichtung für die 37 Pro. explosionsfähige O-2968	G 311 (100 St)
OSW			

#43	1	Schicht-Potentiometer	100 kOhm, 1 W		
#44	1	Stimmt	für Ms 2		
III) <u>Fassungsteil</u>					
C 11	1	Trimmerkondensator	15...45 pF		
C 12	1	Papierkondensator	4, uF, 500 V		
C 13	1	Papierkondensator	2, uF, 450 V		
Fa 1	1	Röhrenfassung	für Röhre OSW 2668		
Sp 1	1	Ablenkjoch	nach Bauzeichnung FZ 101-21 und 22		
Sp 2	1	Konsentrierspule	100 Windungen 0,4 AL auf dem Kern der Spule (Sp 2)		
St 7	1	Kurzschlußstecker			
W 45	1	Schichtwiderstand	1 MOhm, 0,25 W		
IV) <u>Ablenkteil</u>					
C 14	1	Elektrolytkondensator	16, uF, 550 V		
C 15	1	Elektrolytkondensator	16, uF, 550 V		
C 16	1	Elektrolytkondensator	16, uF, 500 V		
C 17	1	Elektrolytkondensator	16, uF, 500 V		
C 18	1	Elektrolytkondensator	16, uF, 500 V		
C 19	1	Papierkondensator	0,1, uF, 500 V		
C 20	1	Papierkondensator	1000 pF, 500 V		
C 21	1	Papierkondensator	5000 pF, 250 V		
C 22	1	Papierkondensator	1000 pF, 250 V		
C 23	1	Elektrolytkondensator	16, uF, 500 V		
Stück Nr.		Bezeichnung	Stückliste Nr.	Stück Nr.	Stück Nr.
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Nr.	Stück 14	Benennung	Zeichn.	Werte
B312	1	Verstärkeröhre		IV 3
B12	1	Feinsicherung		2 A
Bt8	1	Kurzschlußstecker		
Tr6	1	Netztransformator		primär: 220 V sekundär: 2x400 V, 150 mA 4 V, 2 A, 2x6,3 V, 5 A
Tr7	1	Synchronisierungs- transformator		Ni/Fe, W 30, 2x220 Wdg. 0,1 CuL
Tr8	1	Transformator (Sperrschwinger)		Ni/Fe, W 30, 2x200 Wdg. 0,1 CuL
Tr9	1	Transformator (Sperrschwinger)		Ni/Fe, W 30, 200/800/2000 Wdg. 0,08 CuL
W46	1	Schichtwiderstand		50 kOhm, 1 W
W47	1	Schichtwiderstand		50 kOhm, 1 W
W48	1	Schichtwiderstand		1 kOhm, 1 W
W49	1	Schichtwiderstand		3 kOhm, 1 W
W50	1	Schichtwiderstand		3 kOhm, 1 W
W51	1	Schichtwiderstand		10 kOhm, 0,5 W
W52	1	Schichtwiderstand		100 kOhm, 0,5 W
W53	1	Schichtwiderstand		5 kOhm, 1 W
W54	1	Schichtwiderstand		30 kOhm, 1 W
W55	1	Schichtwiderstand		2 kOhm, 2 W
W56	1	Schicht-Potentiometer		10 kOhm, 3 W
W57	1	Schichtwiderstand		40 kOhm, 10 W
W58	1	Schichtwiderstand		3 kOhm, 10 W
W59	1	Schichtwiderstand		10 kOhm, 6 W
W60	1	Schichtwiderstand		50 kOhm, 1 W
W61	1	Schichtwiderstand		50 kOhm, 1 W

Stückliste Nr.	5
G 311 (EP, St)	6
OSW	

Prüf- und Montageanleitung für die
3" Projektionsabbl. Röhre
OSW 1668

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Lfd. Nr.	Stückzahl	Bezeichnung	Werte	Einheit
W62	1	Schichtwiderstand	20 kOhm,	1 W
W63	1	Schichtwiderstand	250 kOhm,	0,5 W
W64	1	Schichtwiderstand	200 kOhm,	0,5 W
W65	1	Schichtwiderstand	10 kOhm,	0,5 W
W66	1	Schichtwiderstand	900 kOhm,	0,5 W
W67	1	Schichtwiderstand	10 kOhm,	2 W
W68	1	Schichtwiderstand	10 kOhm,	2 W
W69	1	Schichtwiderstand	70 kOhm,	2 W
W70	1	Gleichwiderstand	für Meßinstrument Nr 4	
W71	1	Gleichwiderstand	für Meßinstrument Nr 5	
W72	1	Schichtwiderstand	2,5 MOhm,	2 W
W73	1	Schicht-Regelwiderstand	10 kOhm,	1 W (1.n)
W74	1	Draht-Regelwiderstand	10 kOhm,	3 W
W75	1	Draht-Potentiometer	3 kOhm,	3 W
W76	1	Draht-Potentiometer	30 kOhm,	2 W
W77	1	Draht-Regelwiderstand	10 Ohm,	5 W
W78	1	Schicht-Regelwiderstand	10 kOhm,	0,5 W (1.n)
W79	1	Draht-Regelwiderstand	500 Ohm,	4 W
W80	1	Schicht-Potentiometer	1 MOhm,	2 W (1.n)
W81	1	Drahtwiderstand	2,5 kOhm,	15 W
Anmerkungen:				
Die bei den Kondensatoren angegebenen Spannungswerte sind Betriebs- spannungswerte, für die Kondensatoren ausgelegt sein müssen.				
Benennung		Stückzahl		
Prüfeinrichtung für die Projektionsgröße OSW 2668		6 311 (BF, B)		6
OSW				6

OSW	Arbeitsvorschrift für Messung des Widerstandes von Halbleitern	AV 181-36b
<p><u>Bestandteile:</u></p> <p>1. Meßstern 2. Meßinstrument 3. Schalter 4. Anschlußkabel 5. Schutztür</p> <p><u>Abschritt:</u></p> <p>1. Vorbereitung des Meßsterns:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Meßstern für USB 2A.4 bzw. USB 21A.4 einbauen. 2) Meßinstrument auf den erforderlichen Meßbereich einstellen: <div style="margin-left: 40px;"> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) $U_f = 15 \text{ V}$ b) $I_f = 5 \text{ A}$ c) $U_a = 1500 \text{ V}$ d) $I_a = 0,1 \text{ mA}$ e) $U_{g1} = 15 \text{ V}$ </div> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3) Schalter für 220 V~ auf "Ein" schalten. 4) Schalter für Gitterspannung auf "Ein" schalten. 5) Zu messende Röhre in die Fassung des Meßsternes einsetzen. 6) Anschlußkabel an den Kühlkörper anschließen. 7) Schutztür schließen. 		
Mit Hilfe der zugehörigen Meßbereichsschalter.		
3g X.3 - 11 AV 185 - 1		

OSW	Arbeits-Vorschrift für:	AV 181-36b
<p>Arbeitsstufen:</p>		
<p>II) Heizstrom messen:</p>		
<p>1) Schalter (H) für Heizung auf "Ein" schalten und mittels Schiebewiderstand (R_2G) auf 12,6 V einstellen:</p> <p>Der sich hierbei einstellende Heizstrom I_H muß zwischen 0,75 und 0,88 A liegen.</p> <p>< 0,75¹⁾ Ausschuß Fehler 70a³⁾</p> <p>> 0,88²⁾ Ausschuß Fehler 70b³⁾</p>		
<p>III) Arbeitspunkt messen:</p>		
<p>1) Voltinstrument U_1 mittels Schiebewiderstand R_1 auf etwa 4 Volt einstellen.</p> <p>2) Drucktaste für U_1 auf "Ein" drücken und Instrument U_1 mittels Drehwiderstand A auf 400 Volt einstellen.</p> <p>3) Instrument I_1 mittels Schiebewiderstand auf 15 mA einstellen:</p> <p>Der sich dadurch einstellende Wert muß zwischen 1 und 4,5 Volt liegen.</p> <p>< 1,0 Ausschuß Fehler 92a</p> <p>> 4,5 Ausschuß Fehler 92b</p>		
<p>IV) Steilheit messen:</p>		
<p>1) Den unter 1.1 3) abgelesenen Wert U_1 um 0,5 Volt verringern und Instrument I_1 ablesen.</p>		
<p>1) bedeutet kleiner als 2) bedeutet größer als 3) Fehlertabelle siehe Arbeitsvorschrift AV 185 - 1</p>		
<p>Bearbeiter: Tag Name: Gelesen: Über oder Werkstat</p>	<p>30.9.49</p>	<p>1 30.9.49</p>

OSW	Arbeits-Vorschrift für:	AV
	Prüfanweisung zum Prüfen der Metall- keramik-Friten 88, 204 und 210 an statischen Metallsch.	181-36b
<p><u>Arbeitsstufen:</u></p> <p>2) Den soeben eingestellten Wert für U_1 um 1 Volt erhöhen und I_1 ablesen:</p> <p><u>Einweisung:</u></p> <p>Die Differenz der beiden abgelesenen Werte muß zwischen 8 und 12 mA/V liegen.</p> <p>< 8 Ausschuß Fehler 85a</p> <p>> 12 Ausschuß Fehler 85b</p> <p>V) <u>Durchgriff messen:</u></p> <p>1) Meßinstrument U_1 mittels Drehwiderstand W_1 auf 800 Volt einstellen.</p> <p>2) Meßinstrument I_1 mittels Schiebewiderstand U_1 auf 15 mA einstellen und Meßinstrument U_1 ablesen:</p> <p>Die mit 4 dividierte Differenz zwischen den unter III 3) und V 2) abgelesenen Werten muß zwischen 0,7 und 1,5 % liegen.</p> <p>< 0,7 Ausschuß Fehler 89a</p> <p>> 1,5 Ausschuß Fehler 89b</p> <p>VII) <u>Anodenschwanzstrom messen:</u></p> <p>1) Meßbereich für Meßinstrument U_1 auf 15 V einstellen:</p> <p>2) Meßinstrument U_1 mittels Schiebewiderstand U_1 auf 18 Volt einstellen:</p> <p>Mit Hilfe der zugehörigen Meßbereichswahlschalter.</p> <p>Meßinstrument I_1 muß weniger als 2 mA anzeigen.</p> <p>> 2 mA Ausschuß Fehler 88</p> <p>VIII) <u>Gitterstrom messen:</u></p> <p>1) Meßinstrument U_1 mittels Schiebewiderstand W_1 auf 14,5 Volt einstellen.</p> <p>2) Meßinstrument I_1 mittels Schiebewiderstand U_1 auf 25 Volt einstellen:</p>		
Blatt 1 von 1 309 49	Blatt 2 von 1 309 49	Blatt 3 von 1 309 49

OSW	Arbeits-Vorschrift für: <u>Prüfungsanleitung zum Prüfen der Metall- keramisch-Verbindungen C98 204 und 205 in statischen Weichsch</u>		AV 181-36b
			Rev. 1.0
Arbeitsstufen:		Hinweise:	
5) Drucktaste "Galv.Taste" drücken und I _{g1} ablesen.		Der abgelesene Wert muß < 10 µA sein. > 10 µA - Ausschluß Fehler 36a	
VIII) <u>Gitterstromeinsteckpunkt messen:</u>			
1) MeBinstrument U _g mittels Schiebewiderstand "H.G." auf 12,6 Volt stellen.			
2) MeBinstrument U _g mittels Drehwiderstand A auf 400 Volt stellen.			
3) Polwechsler für I _{g1} auf Plus stellen.			
4) Drucktaste "Galv.Taste" drücken und MeBinstrument I _{g1} mittels Schiebewider- stand U _g auf 0,5 µA ein- stellen.		Der vom MeBinstrument U _g ab- gelesene Wert muß kleiner als 1,5 Volt sein. > 1,5 Volt - Ausschluß Fehler 67	
5) Polwechsler für I _{g2} auf Minus stellen.			
IX) <u>Abschließende Arbeiten:</u>			
1) Schalter für U _g , H _g und 220 V~ auf "Aus" schalten.			
2) Schutztür öffnen.			
3) Abschlußkabel vom Kühl- körper abstecken und Röhre aus der Fassung des MeBinstrumentes herausnehmen.			
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REPORT NO.

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NO. OF ENCLS.
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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

The attached copy of a report entitled "The Status of Morale Within the Paramilitary Police" is sent to you for retention as a matter of special interest to you.

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THE STATUS OF MORALE WITHIN THE
PARAMILITARY POLICE

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A. Introduction

1. Allied intelligence agencies have been concerned with the Order of Battle of the paramilitary police, strength estimates, disposition, equipment, etc., in their considerations of the purpose and combat effectiveness of the paramilitary police. This study, based on the

is primarily an attempt to arrive at a considered estimate of the political morale situation in the paramilitary police. The term morale is used in the sense of "will to strive for the attainment of a specific political objective" rather than combat morale, "readiness to engage in combat with an armed enemy."

2. Ever since the inception of the paramilitary police units, Allied military experts have been analyzing Order of Battle information to determine whether these units are destined to take over an internal security function, or whether they are to be used as a combat unit in support of Russian aggression. The ultimate purpose of an armed force organized under Communist auspices is best revealed by a close scrutiny of the activities of its political branch, which is entrusted with the entire morale problem. Any Communist army is given a closely coordinated military-political training designed to imbue each soldier with a fanatic zeal for the accomplishment of his mission. The political mission of the paramilitary police has not been spelled out in words. The officers and the functionaries of the HVA maintain that this is to be an internal police force, which will eventually relieve the Russian occupation troops. For this alone the force is too strong, and will be

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too heavily armed. Moreover, the time and energy spent in political indoctrination suggests a greater role. The East German Government leaders have frequently declared their avowed purpose of overthrowing the West German Republic, and are presumably merely biding their time until they can call upon the HVA effectives for this task.

3. The progress of the military training and the numerical expansion of the paramilitary effectives have remained far below original conservative estimates. On the other hand, political indoctrination, which has been favored above all other types of training, has progressed almost to a point where the troops could be committed to serve Communist expansionist plans. This political indoctrination must be taken into account in any plans for containing or combatting the paramilitary police.

4. Initial reports about the formation of Russian-sponsored paramilitary units in the Eastern zone of Germany, coupled with the unconfirmed rumors of German contingents in Soviet PW camps (variously called Seydlitz and Paulus armies) led observers to speculate on the prospects of a German-Russian military alliance. Subsequent information indicates that the Soviets are scarcely engaged in reviving and forming an alliance with German militarism. The Soviets are in fact engaged in creating an army cadre composed of German nationals. From a strictly military point of view, this cadre is in reality an extension of the Soviet military machine in Eastern Europe. There can be no talk of an alliance, insomuch as there is little or no autonomy granted to these units, and Russian militarism and Communist ideology are the dominant themes. The Soviets are engaged on a

project more diabolical in prospect than a mere re-arming of an Eastern German army; they are forming a tightly knit body of single-minded Communist fanatics who will be militarily and ideologically suited to combatting foreign troops as well as engaging in civil warfare.

5. This study includes a resume of the combat effectiveness and a detailed picture of the political morale of the paramilitary police. The effect of the political zeal which is being engendered must not be underestimated, because an army fanatically fighting for a specific objective can overrun a better trained, better equipped, numerically superior force in an actual showdown.

II. Political Ideological Training

1. At the present time the entire personnel of the HVA is subject to an intensive all-pervading ideological training designed to mold them all into Communist fanatics. This type of political training was undoubtedly envisaged from the very beginning, but has only been coordinated during the last year and made functional during the last six months. It is difficult to estimate how far this program has progressed, and how much more time will be required before the paramilitary force can be put to the test. The following is a resume of the development of the paramilitary police, intended to point out the type of personnel involved and the ideological training given so far, as a basis on which to estimate the "political morale" of the paramilitary police.

2. In its initial phase, September/October 1948, the paramilitary

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police drew its effectives almost exclusively from the existing pool of the uniformed constabulary. The men were chosen on the basis of previous military training and evidence of political reliability, and in some cases men were drawn from the border police, with no previous military experience. These men, selected by the police headquarters of the various Laender, formed the cadres of the 250-men Bereitschaften. Many of the individuals affected welcomed the new development, and saw in it promotions and better living conditions; others were skeptical, and some even resorted to mutiny (e.g., refusal to unload machine guns by some Saxon units). Most of the causes of dissatisfaction were overcome by political arguments, buttressed by the emoluments the paramilitary police could offer.

3. The next wave of recruits which began in the fall of 1948 was more carefully selected. They were drawn from among the inmates of Soviet PW camps, and were chosen for officer, non-commissioned officer, and enlisted ranks in the paramilitary police. Their selection had begun in July 1948. Without giving any indication of the purpose, prisoners were screened, and those who had been politically active and done outstanding work in the PW camps and who were residents of the Eastern Zone of Germany were selected. In selecting former officers, the following standards were applied:

- a. A clean record while serving in the German army;
- b. Political activity, or at least a loyal attitude while in PW camps;
- c. Membership in the so-called "Antifaschistisches Lageraktiv";

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- d. Officers who had come up through the ranks, and especially those of proletarian or lower middle class background, were favored;
- e. Officers with little prospect of finding a position on return to Germany.

After approximately 150 officers and 1,000 enlisted men had been selected, they were concentrated in a special camp near Moscow. Here the Soviets began a program of re-molding the outlook of their selectees in a very important respect, designed to fit them for their future vocation. Military courtesy was reinstated. The German command of the camp, and the Lageraktiv were instructed to enforce discipline. Special lectures were given by the Soviets to explain this measure to the enlisted men. As all this was directly counter to the policy encountered previously in Soviet PW camps, the initial reaction was unfavorable, and there were isolated cases of protest. A further interrogation eliminated about 50 officer candidates, and the remaining 100 or so were then formally enrolled into the People's Police. The same procedure was followed for the enlisted men. Thus right from the beginning these recruits were apparently politically reliable. The majority of the selectees, though lacking all enthusiasm for the resumption of their military careers, readily assented, yielding to the irresistible desire to go home. The former officers selected for service with the People's Police were accorded a home-coming welcome organized to impress them with the importance of their new positions.

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Field grade and general officers were invited to spend a leave with their families at government expense at a health resort in the Erzgebirge. They were visited by ranking dignitaries of the East Zone Administration, and once more carefully scrutinized. Walter Ulbricht addressed the officers, informing them in general terms about their new duties, and mentioned in passing that they would be equipped with tanks and artillery, and would eventually number some 400,000 men. Lieutenant General Vinzenz Mueller spoke for the group and assured Ulbricht of the loyalty and fighting spirit of those present.

4. Training during the first year (October 1948-September 1949) was governed by a uniform training program which set aside three months for police training. One of the reasons adduced for the inclusion of straight police training was that members of the paramilitary police if called upon by the public to perform police functions should (at least for camouflage reasons) be capable of doing so adequately. Whether by design or inadvertantly the comparatively slow transition to outright military training presumably averted a serious morale crisis which an abrupt launching of a military training program would have entailed. By the time the paramilitary personnel fully realized what was behind the designation "Grenz und Bereitschaften", the shock had worn off, and their continued allegiance was not jeopardized.

5. The responsibility for putting the training program into effect rested, during the first year, with the staff section of the various

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leader an arrangement which resulted in considerable diversity of methods. For example, the enforcement of discipline was greatly exaggerated in Saxony and practically neglected in other Laender. At this time the Soviets began insisting on "absolute" discipline in the Soviet sense. Since this involved the enforcement of restrictions far beyond anything practised in the old German Army, considerable opposition grew in the enlisted ranks. The Polit/Kultur functionaries vainly tried to appeal to them on a political basis, talking of Party discipline. The rank and file of the paramilitary police were not yet sufficiently trained along political lines to comprehend this necessity. All this contributed to rather unsatisfactory overall results of training during the first year. The exigencies of a rapidly growing organization, however, required that most of the inadequately prepared trainees had to be charged with the training of new arrivals recruited to fill the ranks of the schools and the 1,000-man Bereitschaften newly organized during the fall of 1949.

6. The recruitment drive in the fall of 1949 was administered by the district police offices of the various Laender, who were allocated recruitment quotas to be met at comparatively short notice. As could be expected, there was a high percentage of mentally and physically unfit recruits as well as many dissatisfied recruits who had been lured into the paramilitary police under false pretenses. Also more
significant, there was no distinction whatsoever between the recruits
slated for schools, and those slated for service in the Bereitschaften.
Many of the students arriving in the schools were not officer material,

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and soon found themselves far beyond their depth. A veritable avalanche of requests for release or transfer ensued, and often those whose requests for release were refused deserted. All this turmoil naturally interfered with a methodical and continuous progress of training and most Objekte soon found themselves in arrears.

7. Political training was a factor in the training of the paramilitary police from the time of its inception, but lack of trained instructors caused it to lag behind the military training. In the fall of 1949 the political training was coordinated, and was to run parallel with the technical training in the schools and the Bereitschaften. Political and military training both fell behind schedule, but the initial difficulties have now been smoothed out, and the ideological training is no longer an implied partner, but rather the dominant factor in the whole training program.

8. Within the schools and Bereitschaften the trainees are insulated as far as possible from all outside contacts, to minimize the opportunities for an objective appraisal of the concepts being taught. The trainee is permitted only one or two town passes a week. Every third Sunday he is permitted home leave, but few live near enough to avail themselves of this privilege. Any convalescent or compassionate leave is charged against his 30 days annual leave. It has been found by experience that the home environment and parental influence have been the most disruptive factors, and account for most of the politically motivated desertions.

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9. The political training in the schools consists of six to eight hours a week of political lectures, and two or three additional half-hour periods are taken up with reading and discussing the daily press. The following subjects are taught: Marxism, Leninism, and their application to topical political events of the week. Besides this, all of the military training is cloaked in an ideological framework, for example, instruction on the use of a carbine will not be confined to the technical details, but will also include a political dissertation in which the carbine becomes a symbol of defense of "democratic" accomplishments against the aggressive capitalist imperialists.

10. While on duty, and even during after-duty hours the trainee seldom manages to evade the disciplinary and political control of his superiors. This represents an adoption of the tested methods applied in the Soviet Army to enforce unquestioning discipline and forestall political deviations. Denying the trainee the uncontrolled use of his after-duty hours is an essential part of the program. After he has completed his eight hours of duty, the trainee is required to devote another three hours to home work. The rest of his time is taken up with Party assemblies, FDJ meetings, literary clubs, and mass cultural activities. The underlying idea is that the trainee will in time develop sufficient interest in these political and cultural activities so that he will lack all incentive to seek out other pastimes. Polit/Kultur functionaries have been adamant in refusing to modify this system. A large number of desertions were attributed to this rigid routine, but the political officials claimed

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that more ideological indoctrination, rather than more free time was the real solution.

11. Trainees are expected to read at least one Communist daily and selected books of a political nature. They are shown movies, and are taken to performances of political plays. Discussion meetings are organized to debate what has been seen and heard. All radio broadcasts are relayed from a central control, and private receivers are not permitted.

12. There have been a large number of desertions during the last year, primarily during the early stages of the new training program; many of the poorly educated recruits could not stand the mental strain of working beyond their capabilities, whereas some youths could not stand the rigid discipline. The number of desertions alone can not be used as a yardstick to measure the political morale, as the HVA officials anticipated some failures, and have themselves been weeding out the unfit. Any recruit who shows a deep-rooted inability or unwillingness to submit to political or military discipline is summarily dismissed. Constant screening is beginning to assure the HVA of a politically homogeneous body of men.

13. A conservative assessment of the effectiveness of the political and ideological indoctrination practised in the HVA gives the following conclusion: After another year even oppositional or unstable elements among the trainees will have succumbed to Communism as taught them. Lacking standards of comparison, their will to resist will have subsided and blind faith will have replaced what little independent reasoning facilities they may still have. Especially

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Communist hate propaganda will have taken root. That was once a motley crowd of lukewarm mercenaries will have been converted into fanatical fighters for the faith. In fact even today there are few among the former German officers and non-commissioned officers now serving in the HVA, representing its least malleable elements, who cannot be called devoted adherents of and fighters for the Communist ideology and its goals.

14. Headquarters personnel of the HVA, officers as well as enlisted men, are also beginning to feel the ubiquity of the political guidance in their daily lives. In the field of political indoctrination they enjoy no exemptions by virtue of their position and preoccupation with pressing daily chores. The Party in clear recognition of the fact that oppositional and political lukewarm elements can only be detected in the limelight of collective political surveillance is determined to block all possibilities of retreat into ideological seclusion.

15. Professional and political schooling of HVA headquarters personnel, called Bereitsenschulung (collective schooling), is mandatory for all. Two hours per week are allocated to military and two hours a week to political subjects. This is counted as duty time. Since the first of August 1950, Saturday has been set aside for all of these training periods.

16. For purposes of political training, the headquarters complement with no distinction as to rank, is broken down into six or seven sections, on the basis of political maturity. The more

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advanced political students are chosen as instructors. The political training is in line with that given within the Objekte. For military subjects the personnel are broken down according to rank, and personnel from the training branch give the instruction.

17. All headquarters personnel are required to attend bi-weekly half hour newspaper study periods. These take place before official duty hours. Lecturers are picked from the group on a rotation system. Important political news is cited verbatim, and the lecturer adds his commentaries. The traditional leitmotiv is the good and peaceful intentions of the East as contrasted with the warlike ambitions of the West.

18. There is a weekly two hour study circle devoted to the history of the CPSU(B). Attendance is not obligatory, but all headquarters personnel are required to know the history of the CPSU(B). Once a week there is a discussion evening devoted to the discussion of political literature and political movies. A familiarity with the subject matter is implied. Those members of the HVA who are members of the SED or Party auxiliaries are subject to even more indoctrination and demands on their free time.

C. The Role of the SED and the Mass Organizations within the HVA.

1. Most of the members of the HVA are also members of the SED, or one of its mass organizations. This is of particular importance because, though the Party doctrine is taught and enforced by the HVA political/military functionaries, the Party organizations, as external

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voluntary associations, are in a good position to control the political reliability of the individuals. This dual loyalty is also of particular importance in ensuring the subservience of the HVA to the SED. There is evidence that Walter Ulbricht, the secretary general of the SED, is taking an increasingly active part in the management of the HVA. There is no evidence to indicate whether or not Wilhelm Zaisser, the former head of the HVA and now Minister of State Security, has any command function over the HVA. There are no indications of any direct connections between the HVA and the Communist Party of the USSR.

2. The SED is certainly the nerve center of the HVA. Staff personnel occupying key positions owe their appointment to the Control Secretariat of the SED and retain their status as ranking Party functionaries, though they are no longer answerable to any of the land directorates of the SED. The present head of the HVA, Heinz Hoffmann, prior to joining the People's Police, was a member of the so-called Kleines Sekretariat of the SED Headquarters of Berlin.

3. Leading officers of the HVA who derive their authority from the Party act in a dual capacity. Their orders are military and at the same time in the nature of a Party assignment, and as such, beyond debate or criticism. This also applies to some extent to non-members.

4. Two thirds of the personnel assigned to HVA Headquarters are either Party members or candidates. HVA Headquarters has its own Party organization. It consists of a Party group sub-divided into five

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so-called Untergruppen A-E. The Party group is headed by a directorate of several members, while the Untergruppen are headed by a committee of four. The HVA Party group meets about once a month, as the need arises. The Untergruppen meet once a week, for some two to four hours. In addition, about once a fortnight political seminars are held. Party candidates attend a two-hour special seminar once a month, where they are taught the basic principles of the Party and their obligations to the Party.

5. The Party meetings emphasize criticism and self-criticism. Almost everyone is subjected to close scrutiny as regards his professional performance, personal attitude and moral conduct. This places a terrific strain on the individual. His private life is exposed to the glare of Party publicity and the occasion usually forms a culminating event in his life in the sense that his whole future career may be affected by the outcome, either favorably or adversely. Those among the members of the Party whose conscience is not completely faultless, are liable to lose their self-control because they imagine, frequently without any reason whatsoever, that the speaker is addressing his strictures to them personally. An example of this individual terror by association would be the occasion when the chief Polit/Kultur functionary of the HVA, Chefinspekteur Doelling, addressed a meeting of Party members and stated the following: "There are people in our midst who debate the question whether it is permitted to purchase a shirt collar in West Berlin or not. Others debate whether one should smoke American

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cigarettes or not. But all that is beside the point. What is important is not the shirt collar or the American cigarette, but the realization that anybody doing such a thing is to be considered a spy and a traitor and that his detection and conviction is called for. There are more indications of that type among those attending this meeting. Everybody should do a better job watching over his neighbor. He should not try to cover up for his neighbor out of a misunderstood feeling of comradeship. Suspects are usually to be found among the best qualified, those with the best personal record. As soon as one among them has disappeared, then everybody has derogatory information or had all along been noticing something out of the ordinary. Only then it is too late." Innumerable examples of this type could be cited. It stands to reason that any person engaged in oppositional activities has to stand up under a constant barrage of veiled accusations and innuendoes and that exceptional demands are made on his cold-bloodedness, nerves, fearlessness and personal security. There is hardly anybody sufficiently strong to hold out under such a strain for very long.

6. The demands on a person's off-duty time, due to Party assignments, political training, political circles, voluntary work, etc., restrict his private sphere to a minimum. Those who are married lose touch with the members of their families. They leave their homes at a time when everybody is still asleep; they return in the evening when everybody has gone to bed. Granted that the press of legitimate work is a considerable one, there is still undoubtedly a method

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behind this system of overburdening the individual. It effectively insulates him from all external impressions and influences. He is forced to develop an interest in collective living. In order to evade the charge that it breaks up families, the HVA has organized a club in the residential district of Berlin-Wendenschloss and certain Party meetings and schoolings are open to members of the family.

7. The numerically largest and most influential mass organization within the HVA is the FDJ. Approximately 75% of the personnel of the HVA belong to it. Some Bereitschaften boast a 100% membership. Each Objekt has an FDJ Gruppe, directed by a full-time functionary called a Jugendsekretär. All other functions are of a part-time nature and are entrusted to functionaries elected from among the FDJ membership. At HVA staff echelon level, Kommandeur Morgenstern, director of Abteilung Jugend of Hauptabteilung Polit/Kultur heads the FDJ program.

8. At FDJ meetings, tasks and events pertaining to the daily military routine are discussed and criticized, and remedies decided upon. In effect the FDJ promotes the interests of the military command along the lines of educating students and helping them along in their military career. The FDJ leadership is responsible for initiating competitions, which provide particular incentives within the training program of the Objekte. FDJ membership is considered to be a distinction. Within the FDJ special circles and Aktivs are formed voluntarily to promote cultural, musical, literary and vocational interests. The attitude of the individual members of the FDJ toward the performance of their duties is particularly important. Voluntary

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self-discipline is engendered, and it becomes a point of honor, rather than a duty. As a practical example, the unloading of a freight car on Sunday, if ordered by the military command, would most likely cause some dissatisfaction, whereas a call for volunteers by the FDJ would produce an ample supply of enthusiastic volunteers.

9. Membership in the Society for Soviet-German friendship is encouraged. There is, however, no branch of the society within the HVA. Members are permitted to participate in public meetings, and to pay membership contributions.

D. The Soviet Role in the HVA.

1. Soviet influence is brought to bear in all fields within the HVA, yet to the rank and file it is all but imperceptible. Directives issued by the HVA command either derive their instigation from Soviet control organs or are at least adapted to meet Soviet views and intentions. The chiefs of the various Hauptabteilung of the HVA are regularly called in by General Petrakovski and his staff officers for consultations. All directives issued to the various Objekte are subject to the scrutiny of the Sovietnik assigned to the Objekte, and if they appear to be contrary to general Soviet policy, the Sovietnik will submit a report to General Petrakovski's headquarters.

2. Each Objekt has two so-called Sovietniks assigned to it. They are Soviet staff officers, usually in rank of major and above. The first Sovietnik is commonly referred to as "Gehilfe" (assistant). The second Sovietnik is a member of the operative staff of the MGB. He is charged with the political and security surveillance of all

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German personnel. In this capacity he works very closely with the Polit/Kultur staff and the HVA liaison officer who represents the interests of the German State Security Service in the Objekt.

3. Sovietniks are shifted around frequently, which accounts for the fact that temporarily T/O positions are left unfilled. The Sovietnik exercises no command functions. He is charged with advisory functions only. The final decision rests with the commandant of the Objekt. The latter will as a matter of course act in accordance with the advice of his Sovietnik. In the long run he could not possibly get away with consistent flouting of the Sovietnik's suggestions.

4. The extent to which Sovietniks interfere in details of command and administration varies in accordance with the initiative displayed by the individual Sovietnik. There are some who concern themselves with the smallest detail. Others are either liberal or indolent. Some are hardly ever seen or heard of. The latter category is particularly obnoxious. Since they have to submit monthly reports they are prone, usually two days before their deadline, to get the whole headquarters into an uproar in order to assemble all pertinent data needed for that report.

5. There exists a keen state of competition between the Sovietniks, each trying to run up a perfect score as far as training and housing is concerned. This occasionally leads to personal friction between them, especially if two Objekte happen to be situated in the same community.

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6. All Sovietniks attend a conference in Karlshorst once a month. Criticisms and suggestions advanced by them are passed on to the HVA for appropriate action. They also participate in important conferences attended by commandants of the Objekte. Their presence in the Objekte is welcomed by most commandants, especially because they frequently are of material help in seeing to it that requisitions for equipment and services are complied with.

7. The first Sovietnik wears the uniform of the Peoples' Police with a simulated rank equivalent to that of the Objekt commandant. Since only few among them speak German, their presence cannot be kept a secret for very long. The second Sovietnik as a rule wears civilian clothes.

8. Some thirty odd German paramilitary officers are attending a year's course at a Moscow War College, and presumably others will attend similar courses. Undoubtedly the Soviets hope to be able to continue to maintain their present rigid control of the HVA, by using Moscow-trained German officers, as replacements for the Sovietniks, when the Russians withdraw their occupation forces.

E. The Morale of the Former German Army Officers.

1. The political metamorphosis of the former loyal German officer is one of the most significant features of the entire political training undertaken by the HVA. One must of course understand that for the most part the officers were very carefully chosen. Those who were drawn from Soviet PW camps represented a small minority of

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politically conscious and active officers, who were shunned and scorned by their fellow officers. They were for the most part true political activists, though some feigned political interest in the hopes of an early return to Germany. A few of the officers chosen in Russia had distinguished themselves in administrative rather than political activities, but even they enjoyed a good political reputation. The officers drawn from civilian life had either already joined the SED or had demonstrated their political reliability in some other manner. Thus it can be seen that most of the officers were politically ripe for their duty within the HVA. Many of the younger officers drawn from Russian PW camps or recruited directly had all of their military training in the German army after 1933, and hence never developed any military loyalty in the Prussian sense, though they were all indoctrinated with an intense hatred of anything Russian, and a contemptuous feeling of superiority over everything Slavic. The political indoctrination program has allowed for this, and the recruits are constantly reminded that the Soviets won the war (presumably single-handed) and that therefore the Soviet military methods and equipment are in every way superior to those of the former German army. The Polit/Kultur functionaries are careful to maintain that the entire Soviet program in Germany is peaceful in aim, and that the Soviets alone are interested in reuniting Germany, and defending its democratic attainments against the aggressive designs of the capitalist world. Undoubtedly those officers who are still not able to swallow the Communist teaching hook, line and sinker, are at least convinced that they are serving an ultimate German cause.

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2. During the past two years there has been a continued sifting out of the former German officers. Some have left voluntarily, or deserted, while others whose loyalty was in doubt have been discharged. Officers who were PWs for any length of time in Western camps have been discharged, despite SED membership and outstanding Party work; officers who have relatives living in the West are regarded with suspicion and have usually had to move their relatives to the East, or divorce themselves entirely from them. (In this connection it can be categorically stated that the Soviets would not consider recruiting any former German officers now resident in the Western Zones of Germany on anything but a very selective scale).

3. The employment of former German army officers in the paramilitary forces was viewed by the radical elements among the rank and file of the SED with serious misgivings. It still does not go down well with the stalwarts of the Party. The majority, however, have been convinced that it is a matter of tactical expediency, and that this concession does not affect the ultimate goal of the destruction of German militarism. Those who are still holding out against this departure are considered to be at variance with the Party line and face expulsion for reactionism. The HVA embraces the Soviet views on this subject. The Soviets point to their own experience after the revolution when they used former czarist officers to advantage; the officers had valuable technical knowledge, and so long as they were not directly oppositional, they served to train new fanatic replacements. In the lower ranks of the paramilitary police this conflict

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was even more apparent, where the Polit/Kultur functionaries often resented the influence of the professional officer, while the Soviet observers would often support the professional officer instead of the political functionary, causing further dissatisfaction. Insofar as possible, this friction is being eliminated by the political indoctrination of the professionally valuable officers, and the replacement of some by newly trained officers who are already politically trained.

4. Wilhelm Zaisser, while still head of the HVA, stated that he preferred a politically non-descript officer to an old Communist who could not keep up with the times. At a recent Party assembly in the HVA, Heinz Hoffmann stated: "We can only use those officers who have the mental agility required to adopt new methods, and to utilize new experiences. We cannot use those who refuse to abandon outmoded teachings, especially in the field of tactics. We already have a sufficient number of trained officer candidates with whom to replace them." Chefinspekteur Doelling, head of Polit/Kultur, commenting on the speech stated: "This is going a bit too far. We just cannot dispense with all of the old and experienced officers. Their experience assists us materially. The young officers may possess political and military elan which, however, if not balanced with experience will soon suffer failure."

5. It would be wishful thinking to imagine that there is any sizeable segment of the officers of the HVA who merely pay lip service to what they are forced to believe, and who are biding their time until a reversal in the fortunes of the USSR takes place in order to

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turn against them. It is conceivably possible that there are still isolated cases of oppositional elements still left within the HVA, but as there is no such thing as a free exchange of ideas in the HVA, it would be almost impossible to detect them. The existence of conspiratorial cells among the officers can safely be ruled out. Some of the officers are primarily interested in their own personal aggrandisement, others sincerely believe that they are serving German as well as Soviet interests, but for the most part even those who felt no particular calling to engage in political work along Soviet/Communist lines, have been put through the big political mill and re-educated.

F. HVA Combat Capabilities as of 31 August 1950.

1. The training phase which ended on 31 August 1950 has led to a satisfactory attainment of its limited objectives, the turning out of soldiers with a basic and primarily formal comprehension of tactics. HVA effectives in schools and Bereitschaften have been sufficiently trained to enable them to perform tactical missions of a police nature. Combat training has not yet reached a stage warranting a serious commitment of HVA effectives. They lack tactical training, especially in the coordinated use of all weapons under combat conditions. Their officers and non-commissioned officers also lack experience required to control tactical units under combat conditions. The personnel currently taking its training in schools and Bereitschaften could be readied for combat within a period of between four and six months from the time of its organization into a tactical unit, provided that intensive combat training is given during the entire time. More

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specifically, a breakdown according to the various training branches reveals the following picture:

- a. The so-called A-Objekte, training future infantry officers and non-commissioned officers, have trained their student personnel up to platoon level. Company level training has been confined to a limited number of functions like the operation of field guards, march security and the like, which can only be performed within the framework of at least company-sized units.
- b. The so-called B-Objekte, specializing in artillery training, have likewise pushed their artillery training to platoon level though confined to a limited number of combat assignments. As regards artillery training, there has been instruction in the technical handling of a variety of German models and calibers and in the operation of aiming devices. In this the Soviet method of training has dominated the traditional German method of concentration on one specific model. The Soviet concept is that the basic principle of all artillery devices should be mastered, so that the various peculiarities of the Soviet pieces ultimately issued can be easily learned. No live ammunition has yet been fired.
- c. The so-called C-Objekte, specializing in armored training, have completed basic infantry training on squad level and taught some combat assignments within the framework of a platoon. As regards their special field of training, their endeavors have been concentrated on training tank drivers. There have been aiming and firing exercises, and the tactical commitment of tank platoons has been practiced.

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d. The so-called D-Objekte, specializes in engineer training. Theoretical training has been given in all phases. Except for such problems as river fording, the building of positions, and building reinforcement, most of the practical training has had to be dispensed with because of lack of equipment. The D-Objekte are also responsible for signal training. The operation of radios, telephones and teletypes has been taught, however, thus far only training aids have been used. It is expected that W/T communication will be installed to link all Objekte and the HVA headquarters. Equipment for such a project has been on order for some time already, from East German firms.

2. Training has progressed sufficiently to begin the formation of tactical units by setting up cadres composed of officers and non-commissioned officers with a basic tactical knowledge. These cadres could then be filled up with recruits. A material personnel increase at the present time would require the availability of army barracks or other housing facilities. They are not available now, and there are no plans readied for future construction of such building facilities. With few exceptions all paramilitary housing is overcrowded.

3. Before large scale combat training can begin, training areas will have to be prepared. The garrison training grounds used by the old German army were parcelled out among the settlers from the East during 1945 and 1946. As yet the Eastern German government has not dared to resort to any new large scale expropriations. The few

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remaining training areas like Döberitz, Altengrabow, Koenigsbrueck and Ohrdruf are being used by Soviet troops and are not available for use by paramilitary units.

4. On the whole training has progressed relatively slowly, but now that the initial training phases are over most of these difficulties have been or can be, overcome.

a. The main problems arose from the haphazard recruiting systems which characterized the initial recruitment of student and training personnel.

b. A further retarding factor was the uneven quality of the training personnel. They had for the most part been drawn from the effectives of the old 250-men Bereitschaften. Both officer and non-commissioned personnel from that source had not advanced very far in their own training, and were furthermore not up to imparting what little knowledge they had to their students. A sprinkling of former Army officers was earmarked for staff positions, and was thus not available for training assignments. The more numerous former Army non-commissioned officers, though experienced in actual combat, had never acquired the training necessary to be good instructors. By and large the training personnel was not up to its task.

c. Many of the hastily activated Objekte were inadequately housed, and often the personnel themselves had to clear away the

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rubble and repair their buildings before the actual training could begin.

d. Another important delaying factor was the fact that an attempt was made to graft Soviet training programs upon a student body which lacked the prerequisites (i.e., a year's basic training). Before the Soviet advisers could be convinced that no useful purpose could be served by starting combat training at the level of launching attacks from readied positions, and before the recruit had had any extended order drill formations, considerable time had been wasted.

e. Friction between the training personnel and the Polit/Kultur Apparat further blighted the building up of smoothly operating training units. The presence of former German officers and non-commissioned officers gave the training personnel the edge on the Polit/Kultur personnel, who suffered from an even greater lack of experience and ability. A general feeling of inferiority began to spread among the Polit/Kultur functionaries which was not conducive to harmonious collaboration between the two main branches. This cleavage has in the meantime been overcome with a synthesis of the two being aspired after. Slogans execrating "specialists" have popularized this trend.

5. Whereas in view of the many initial difficulties which faced the HVA it is hardly justifiable to estimate the training progress by the time spent now that remedial action has taken place, the future

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training will probably maintain a steady pace. During the past six months an intensification of training has taken place, aided by such devices as inter-unit competition organized by the FDJ within the HVA, and the formation of training Aktivs which devote themselves to tutoring students who fall behind during off-duty hours.

6. There are no inherent weaknesses left likely to affect the morale or discipline of the HVA personnel to any serious extent. All negative factors such as desertions and criminal acts are of isolated significance.

G. Conclusion.

1. Boiled down to bare essentials, given six months intensive combat training (after 1 September 1950) and additional personnel, the HVA will be, militarily speaking, capable of aggressive attack. The present indoctrination program will be sufficiently advanced within another year, so that the personnel will be in favor of any plan the Soviets might dictate, and they could conceivably be pitted effectively against better trained, larger forces.

2. It is difficult to form an estimate of the will to fight within the HVA at the present time, since all of the teachings presuppose a defensive role forced upon the HVA effectives by an unprovoked American attack. However, a ranking staff officer of the HVA gives the following impression of how his colleagues would react.

a. If called upon to oust the Allies from Western Berlin, most of the officers would respond enthusiastically, fully believing

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that such an attack was justified, and that it would be localized to Berlin.

b. If they were called upon to attack Western Germany, facing the present Allied armies alone, they would fully believe that they were ousting the hated capitalist-imperialist from German soil, and would maintain a good fighting spirit against odds. They would even be ready to engage in armed combat against German soldiers fighting under allied banners, believing that they were mere tools of the imperialists.

c. If they were called upon to attack Western Germany, defended only by a West German Army, they would not fight enthusiastically. They would stand in awe of their former comrades in arms, and they are not ideologically ready to face civil war to enlighten the West Germans.

d. They would be prepared to fight against an Allied army on West German soil, no matter how the German civilian population reacted. They have been taught to believe that the civilian population of Western and Eastern Germany are politically "backward", and need to be enlightened. They have already demonstrated their ability to perform very unpopular police action against the Eastern German civilian population, in the activities of the "Ring around Berlin."

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